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ABSTRACT
The business of mineral extraction fundamentally entails
environmental costs and social challenges. However, the harm
caused by operations is disproportionately present in the
developing (as opposed to the developed) country context. Using an
interdisciplinary approach, this paper seeks to uncover why the
presence of extractive industries in developing countries inhibits
development by delving into the role of law in the governance of
transnational corporations. The transnational order is evolving
toward an era of sector-specific, non-hierarchical collective global
governance mechanisms such as the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI). This paper responds to social science
research which deemed the EITI ineffective at affecting key
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governance indicators. It counters this finding by demonstrating
that effectiveness is an insufficient metric for assessing regulatory
quality in this context and then proffers an alternative metric.
Instead, mechanisms like the EITI are better assessed by the twoprong test developed herein: (1) the role it plays in catalyzing
consensus and changing institutional behaviors and (2) the
mechanism’s institutional flexibility. This paper explores how a
departure from the concepts enshrined in linear liability models will
be required to achieve the EITI’s sustainable development goals.
The cornerstone contribution of this paper is its innovative
introduction of the notion of “collaborative accountability” in the
place of more traditional linear responsibility concepts. It sets out
the argument that organizations like the EITI that possess the
concepts of collaborative accountability have a robust potential to
positively impact the governance of transnational corporations.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Achieving Sustainable Development through Collective
Governance
Sustainable development has been defined as human progress
that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”1 It is a
developmental concept recognizing the existence of the three
intertwined dimensions to progress: social, economic, and
environmental. Sustainable development aims to balance these
indivisible objectives. In 2015, the United Nations sought to more
specifically delineate sustainable development targets in its
Sustainable Development Goals.2 Achieving these goals requires
national and subnational political reforms, access to knowledge and
resources, and the rethinking of existing international governance
frameworks.3 Sustainable development recognizes that while
nature imposes certain thresholds, growth is critical to
sustainability, especially within the context of developing nations.
However, it has become increasingly clear that this growth can no
longer be based on the overexploitation of natural resources, but
must be managed in a way that enhances the societies in which such
resources are produced. We have entered into a new era in the
history of development. It is an era of managing natural resources,
not simply exhausting them; an era of linking economic growth and
environmental protection in strategies for sustainable
development.4
Achieving sustainable development will require an
unprecedented global effort, only possible under a shared global
framework consisting of both authority and accountability
mechanisms.5 Redrafting components of the existing framework
1
World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future:
From One Earth to One World, (Mar. 20, 1987), http://www.un-documents.net/ourcommon-future.pdf [https://perma.cc/CLQ9-RQS9].
2
G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, at 1 (Sept. 25, 2015).
3
World Comm’n on Env’t & Dev., supra note 1, at 29.
4 Id. at 30.
5
Johan Rockstrӧm & Jeffrey D. Sachs with Marcus C. Ӧhman & Guido
Schmidt-Traub, Sustainable Development and Planetary Boundaries, SUSTAINABLE DEV.
SOLUTIONS NETWORK: A GLOBAL INITIATIVE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS, at 21 (May
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requires involvement from a diverse set of stakeholders that must
also include the private sector.6 Private sector involvement will
require transnational oversight that is broader than even the best
laid corporate social responsibility (CSR) efforts.7 This politically
enlarged concept of corporate accountability8 extends beyond the
boardroom, taking the form of a collective effort by government,
civil society, and industry.9 While it is recognized herein that
transnational oversight of this magnitude requires an international
collective governance mechanism, I do so with pause as I by no
means advocate moving toward a “world government.”
Extrapolating existing command and control concepts imbedded
within domestic regimes and implementing them in toto at the
international level would result in an overly bureaucratic system
devoid of true democracy. Such a system would be even more
“accommodating to power, more hospitable to hegemonic ambition,
and more reinforcing of the roles of states and governments rather
than the rights of people.”10 Despite these concerns, it is the nature
of global problems that they must be solved with global solutions.11
Hence, collective governance mechanisms at the international level
will be required in order to achieve sustainable development.
One essential aspect of these collective mechanisms is the
promotion of regulatory quality at the national and subnational
level.12 Regulatory quality “[r]eflects perceptions of the ability of the
government to formulate and implement sound policies and
regulations that permit and promote private sector development.”13
2013), http://www.post2015hlp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/RockstroemSachs-Oehman-Schmidt-Traub_Sustainable-Development-and-PlanetaryBoundaries.pdf [https://perma.cc/PBE9-HX6V].
6 See Florian Wettstein, Corporate Responsibility in the Collective Age: Toward a
Conception of Collaborative Responsibility, 117 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 155, 173 (2012)
(equating corporate responsibility with political responsibility).
7
Nathan Andrews, A Swiss-Army Knife? A Critical Assessment of the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative in Ghana (EITI), 121 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 59, 68 (2016).
8
Wettstein, supra note 6, at 173.
9
Andrews, supra note 7, at 68.
10
MARK BEVIR, GOVERNANCE: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 107 (2012).
11
Wettstein, supra note 6, at 157.
12 See BEVIR, supra note 10, at 107 (stating that although there are a number of
other developmental objectives, for the purpose of limiting the scope of this piece,
the focus herein is exclusively on regulatory quality).
13 See Benjamin K. Sovacool, Gӧtz Walter, Thijs Van de Graaf & Nathan
Andrews, Energy Governance, Transnational Rules, and the Resource Curse: Exploring
the Effectiveness of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), 83 WORLD
DEV. 179, 183 (2016) (explaining the weakness of the EITI Compliance Status, which
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There are two sides to the coin of regulatory quality: the input and
the output. In other words: the decision-making process
surrounding the creation and implementation of regulation, as well
as, the accountability mechanism enforcing that regulation.
Therefore, collective governance models simultaneously seek to
promote democratic participation in this decision-making process
with the aim that this participatory process will lead to greater
regulatory quality at the subnational and national levels, and thus
enhance corporate accountability. However, based on a review of
social science literature, it is apparent that there exists a breakdown
in corporate accountability. As such, the analysis herein will seek to
identify the source of that breakdown and advocate an evolutionary
iteration to the accountability component of existing collective
global governance mechanisms at the international level.14
This work will explore how rethinking a particular aspect—the
accountability mechanism—of collective global governance
frameworks will enhance sustainable development progress by
begetting improved regulatory quality at the national and
subnational levels. The remainder of this chapter discusses the
concepts of globalization, its role in cultivating structural harm, and
the research methodology employed herein, which seeks to
contextualize and frame the larger discussion. Chapter 2, breaks
down the definitional elements of governance honing in on its
regulatory aspects, followed by a walkthrough of the regulatory
transition from external supervision to self-regulation as catalyzed
by globalization. The subsequent segment delves deeper into these
self-regulation methods of governance which began with CSR but
have evolved into corporate participation in public-private
partnerships (PPPs). These PPPs, one type of collective governance
mechanism, are characterized by two concrete elements:
transparency and stakeholder engagement. The notion is that these
elements—along with the more nuanced organizational ability to
adaptively problem-solve—have the capability of begetting
corporate accountability, but an examination of the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (‘EITI’) in Chapter 3
demonstrates that a breakdown in accountability occurs because the
current framework is reliant upon the ill-fitting concept of linear
liability. Chapter 4 proffers a departure from the inclusion of linear
is likely caused by: a limited mandate, voluntary nature, stakeholder resistance, and
dependence on strong civil society).
14
BEVIR, supra note 10, at 107.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss4/3

2019]

ETI as a Model for Collaborative Accountability

845

liability in the framework and advocates a move toward a notion of
collaborative accountability.
1.2. Globalization
Globalization is becoming increasingly accepted as an economic,
political, and societal reality. Despite this broad conceptual
recognition, globalization lacks a hard-and-fast definition.
Generally speaking, the term globalization refers to entrenched and
enduring patterns of global interconnectedness. The transactions
associated with this interconnectedness continue to grow in
magnitude and intensity, enmeshing societies in worldwide systems
and networks.15 This global interconnectedness is swiftly changing
the nature of harm, which calls for a shift in the nature of
governance.16 In the midst of this global transition, it is becoming
increasingly apparent that existing global governance mechanisms
are no longer equipped to face current global challenges.17 The
world is transitioning toward an era requiring collective and
collaborative responses to global challenges arising from and
compounded by the ever-increasing interconnections between
people and communities across the globe.18 Naturally, such a
tectonic societal and political shift will have a momentous impact on
the legal responsibility of businesses if we intend to achieve
sustainable development.19
This interconnectedness of globalization has been the fertile soil
for the incredible growth associated with transnational
corporations. As such, another hallmark of globalization is the
rampant blurring of the lines between private enterprise and public
interest.20 Due to the relatively recent and striking amassment in
size, income, and technological capacity of transnational
corporations rivaling that of many nations, it has become
increasingly difficult to regulate and monitor corporate activities
and compliance. Even the most powerful and developed nations
face surmounting difficulties in controlling the activities of
15
16
17
18
19
20

Wettstein, supra note 6, at 156.
Id. at 181.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sovacool et al., supra note 13, at 187.
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businesses.21 The unfortunate reality is that governments are
generally unwilling to regulate transnational companies even when
legal regulation is plausible. This is particularly the case when such
entities operate outside of their jurisdiction.22 This phenomenon
creates an accountability gap which leaves transnational companies
under-regulated at best and the populations residing where they
operate without recourse in the event of damage.
A transnational system is multi-actor by definition. States are
embedded in a broader and deeper transnational arena. Borders are
“transcended” rather than crossed, relations become increasingly
“supraterriorial” as distance, and borders and geographic space
itself lose economic and political significance. It is a system in the
throes of evolution where uncertainty about structures,
relationships, norms and institutions abounds.23 Increasingly,
private actors operate in authoritative positions and fulfill
governing functions, which were previously seen as the exclusive
domain of governments.24 This combination of fragmentation and
shift in public authority to private actors can lead to structural harm,
most notably in the developing country context.
1.3. Structural Harm
Structural harm is harm caused to a governance system. It is
distinct from the concept of “social violence,” where the governance
structure and institutions cause individual inequity.25 Structural
harm is also distinct from intentional wrongful acts of an individual
agent or the willfully repressive policies of a state, in that it lacks the
intent to do harm.26 Rather, this type of harm is the inability of the
21
PENELOPE SIMONS & AUDREY MACKLIN, THE GOVERNANCE GAP: EXTRACTIVE
INDUSTRIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE HOME STATE ADVANTAGE 7 (2014).
22 See Stephen J. Kobrin, Private Political Authority and Public Responsibility:
Transnational Politics, Transnational Firms, and Human Rights, 19 BUS. ETHICS Q. 349,
351 (2009) (explaining that transnational corporations should be held liable for
human rights violations, but liability is often complicated by the discontinuity
between the political structures of the corporations).
23 Id. at 359-60.
24
Wettstein, supra note 6, at 162.
25 See THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE OF POVERTY 47 (David
Brady & Linda M. Burton eds. 2016) (discussing the distinction between structural
and social violence).
26 See Iris Marion Young, Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection
Model, 23 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 102, 114 (2006) (clarifying the claims about global
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institution to develop itself in a manner sufficient to govern
effectively. Structural harm is the systemic destabilization of
governance and institutional structures at the national or subnational
level, and results in the deterioration and breakdown of mechanisms
that drive the creation of stable governance institutions and social
structures within a localized society.
Providing effective regulatory oversight of transnational
corporations is difficult due in large part to the nature of modern
corporate entities. Transnational corporations are challenging the
traditional concepts of both the law of corporations and
international law, in that legal concepts fashioned to serve a society
in which the role of business was limited and local have become
archaic in a world where business is conducted worldwide by giant
corporate groups comprised of affiliated companies organized in
dozens of countries.27 In today’s globalized world, corporate actors
have the potential to cause and contribute to structural harm in the
societies where they operate simply by going about routine
activities—even without the intent to cause harm in a conventional
sense. 28
The ability for a corporate actor to contribute to (distinct from
cause) structural harm is particularly relevant in contexts where
institutional governance structures are weak, or where the rule of
law is lacking.29 Developing nations face greater challenges than
developed nations in providing effective regulatory oversight of
transnational corporations.30 This is due in large part to existing
structural and institutional inadequacies.31 Often, developing nations
lack the institutional structure in the form of political will, technical
capacity, as well as physical infrastructure, to provide effective
regulatory oversight of transnational corporations.32 One of the
overarching structural reasons for the breakdown of governance
institutions in developing nations is that the capacity of many
developing governments to regulate foreign investment “has been
undermined by years of economic intervention by international
financial institutions and is deeply embedded in the structure of the
justice and injustice which are popular in our world and theorizing about the
responsibility of moral agents).
27
Kobrin, supra note 22, at 358.
28
Wettstein, supra note 6, at 157.
29 Id.
30
SIMONS & MACKLIN, supra note 21, at 7–8.
31 Id.
32 Id.
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international system” through trade and investment treaties.33
International trade and investment treaties, as well as, investor-state
contracts, tend to constrain government capacity to introduce public
interest legislation and regulations.34 Therefore, a host nation may
lack the institutional structures to enforce laws and regulations.
Developing host governments may also lack political will in that
they may be disinclined to impose regulatory constraints on foreign
corporate actors out of a desire to attract and retain foreign
investment.35
This type of structural harm occurs typically as a consequence of
a multiplicity of individuals, organizations, and institutions acting in
pursuit of what would otherwise be fruitful endeavors in another
context. 36 In essence, they are playing by the rules, yet still they are
causing harm even where it is counter to their intent. 37 “Such
structural injustice arguably poses new challenges to the problemsolving capacities of governments. The roots of such problems are
not only notoriously complex and difficult to comprehend, but they
often systematically lie beyond the reach of any one government.”38
Previously, a distant, local development would have been a
relatively isolated incident, yet it now has the potential to have farreach impacts causing significant global repercussions.39 The everincreasing degree of structural interconnectedness that characterizes
our world today has changed both the nature of harm, as well as,
that of the governance responses required to prevent and alleviate
it. 40
1.4. Research Methods
This piece utilizes non-doctrinal, empirical research methods to do
two things. First, to seek to identify the mechanism within
contemporary collective governance models that allows structural
Id. at 180.
Id.
35 Id. at 181.
36 See Wettstein, supra note 6, at 157 (explaining the unintended consequences
of structured social action).
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 See id. at 156 (describing the global increase in structural interconnections).
40 Id.
33
34
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harm to perpetuate. Second, to proffer a new iteration in the evolution
of the accountability mechanisms of these models. This concept is
termed herein as collaborative accountability. For the purposes of such
an assessment, doctrinal legal research would have proved
insufficiently narrow in scope in that it fails to recognize the social
conditions essential to understanding the problems addressed herein.41
Rather, non-doctrinal legal research can be said to take a “law in
context” approach.42 This type of research seeks to transcend
traditional, silo-ed academic understanding. It integrates knowledge
streams from various disciplines in order to create connections
between these disciplines. This network allows for deeper insight and
explanations of complex issues, which no discipline can do singlehandedly.43
Empirical research—analyzing data to draw
conclusions44—is required to delve into complex societal issues such as
globalization and sustainable development.45 This is directly relevant
here, as this piece addresses how globalization’s impact on harm
inhibits sustainable development.
As such, interdisciplinary research is particularly relevant in the
sense that it is necessary to understand the broader scope of the
problem. This type of research in general and my research specifically
41 See Ron van Gestel & Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, Revitalizing Doctrinal Legal
Research in Europe: What About Methodology? 4 (Eur. U. Inst., Working Papers Law
2011/05,
2011)
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/16825/LAW_2011_05.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ET3W-CEWP] (explaining the need for the integration of social
facts in legal methodology).
42 See Van Gestel & Micklitz, supra note 41, at 26 (describing the increasing
support for a “law in context” approach); Law in Action, U. WIS. L. SCH. (2017),
http://law.wisc.edu/law-in-action/davislawinactionessay.html
[https://perma.cc/RU2T-PGUC] (detailing the application of law in action
approach at University of Wisconsin Law School); see also Paul D. Carrington &
Erika King, Law and the Wisconsin Idea, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 297 (1997),
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1154&context=fac
ulty_scholarship, [https://perma.cc/5FSQ-NFBA] (describing the developmental
history of law in action at the University of Wisconsin).
43 See Arild Buanes & Svein Jentoft, Building Bridges: Institutional Perspectives
on Interdisciplinarity, 41 FUTURES 446, 446–47 (2009) (speaking to the necessity of
interdisciplinary approaches in order to solve “real world” problems); Am. Ass’n
for the Advancement of Sci., Facilitating Interdisciplinary Research and Education: A
Practical Guide 3 (Edward G. Derrick et al. eds., 2012) (describing the potential of
interdisciplinary research).
44 See Van Gestel & Micklitz, supra note 41 (explaining the varied definitions
of empiricism within legal research).
45 See Gunilla Öberg, Facilitating Interdisciplinary Work: Using Quality
Assessment to Create Common Ground, 57 HIGHER EDUC. 405, 406 (2009) (describing
both the need for and challenges associated with interdisciplinary work).
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is useful for transferring information from the “laboratory” to the real
world. Principle 1 of the EITI states that “the prudent use of natural
resource wealth should be an important engine for sustainable
economic growth that contributes to sustainable development.”46
Interdisciplinary research is the tool by which one can analyze the
effectiveness of the EITI’s ability to contribute positively to
sustainable development. If its efforts fail in doing so, the EITI needs
to keep reshaping itself. By understanding the social contexts of the
problem, we can better understand the necessary legal steps to
undertake in the evolutionary process.
This research, although interdisciplinary, is situated clearly within
the social sciences.47 Sociology is utilized to define the problem in that
qualitative social science research is analyzed to determine the
effectiveness of the EITI. This assessment relies on the existing data
and literature from sociological researchers regarding the impact of the
EITI on regulatory quality across implementing countries. Ultimately
though, this research meets at the crossroads of law and political
science by engaging directly in a review of the impacts of globalization
on the nature of harm and governance. 48 These concepts are
fundamentally rooted in political science discourse. However, the
piece retains legal character in that it analyzes how concepts such as
linear liability further perpetuate structural harm. By analyzing the
political science trends, one is able to understand how legal concepts of
liability might continue to evolve in order to mitigate structural harm.
The object of the research is twofold in that it aims to further the
expertise of the field of law, as well as, address a specific social
problem. In this way, the piece endeavors to contribute to legal
academic literature and political policy.49

46
Clare Short, The Development of the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative, 7 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & BUS. 8, 11–12 (2014).
47 See Joyce Tait & Catherine Lyall, Short Guide to Developing Interdisciplinary
Research Proposals, THE INST. FOR THE STUD. OF SCI., TECH., AND INNOVATION 2 (Mar.
2007),
https://jlesc.github
.io/downloads/docs/ISSTI_Briefing_Note_1Writing_Interdisciplinary_Research_Proposals.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3W8GLALF] (defining interdisciplinary research that falls within social sciences).
48 See THE OÑATI INT’L INST. FOR THE SOC. OF L., THEORY AND METHOD IN SOCIOLEGAL RESEARCH 5 (Reza Banakar & Max Travers eds., 2005) (describing the
sociological diversity of law).
49 See Tait & Lyall, supra note 47, at 2 (describing the use of interdisciplinary
research in order to further policy goals).
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2. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE REGULATORY TRANSITION
2.1. Governance Defined
As the nature of harm shifts, so must the nature of governance
in order to best address the harm it seeks to mitigate. Governance
is the process of governing, rather than an institution.50 Although
it is often institutions that do the work of governing, governance is
about “processes of rule more than institutions of government”.51
The term “governance” highlights the reality that governing may
occur in a more collective context without an effective sovereign
power. This means that it may be undertaken – as was traditionally
the case – by a government, but also via the market or another
governance network. Governance can occur through hard laws or
social norms. It also differs from government in that it focuses less
on the state and its institutions and more on social practices and
activities.52 Regulation, in this context, may occur through selfmonitoring, as well as, external supervision. Similarly, coordination
between the various governed bodies can be the result of mutual,
voluntary cooperation among actors, as well as, of rules in a
hierarchic organization.53
These means of regulation and
coordination are not mutually exclusive. For example, both types of
regulation – self-monitoring and external supervision – can and
often do occur within a single governance system.
Global interconnectedness delivers a direct challenge to
territorial principles of modern social and political organization.54
Current public problems do not always fall neatly under the
jurisdiction of a specific agency or even a particular nation.55
Effective global governance today requires new governing
strategies to span jurisdictions, link people across all levels of
government, and mobilize a variety of stakeholders.56 This results
in a fragmentation of the traditional links between political

50
51
52
53
54
55
56

BEVIR, supra note 10, at 1.
BEVIR, supra note 10, at 11.
BEVIR, supra note 10, at 1.
BEVIR, supra note 10, at 82.
BEVIR, supra note 10, at 4, 83.
BEVIR, supra note 10, at 4.
BEVIR, supra note 10, at 4–5.
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authority and public accountability.57 Global governance extends
across territorial bounds and – among other objectives – seeks to
manage the global commons, regulate transnational activities, and
promote sustainable development.58 Not only have the once distinct
realms among subnational, national, and international governance
structures begun to blur, but so has the line between private and
public governance.59
The processes of governing now involve more diverse actors and
more diverse organizational forms.60 Increasingly, governments
rely on private and voluntary sector actors to manage and deliver
governance services.61 State power and state action is now dispersed
among a vast array of spatially and functionally distinct networks
consisting of all kinds of public, voluntary, and private
organizations.62 Due to these interdependencies, the regulatory
power of national governing institutions has become increasingly
constrained.63 This increasing range and variety of stakeholders has
led to the emergence of new self-regulatory practices and collective
institutional designs, ranging from formal CSR schemes to PPPs
such as the EITI.64 “Governance” in this sense then moves beyond
the aforementioned abstract definitions and also captures the
concrete formal and informal responses to the changing global
order. 65
Corporations are perceived as powerful forces in the emerging
new global governance structure, exerting power to a degree that we
have commonly assumed only with governments. This new
situation calls for a deliberative turn in our thinking, not only in
regard to corporate authority, which embeds corporate decisionmaking in the political planning processes,66 but also in the nature
of corporate accountability.
There is no doubt that large
57 See Wettstein, supra note 6, at 161 (describing the shift to collaborative
responsibility).
58
BEVIR, supra note 10, at 4, 83.
59 See Wettstein, supra note 6, at 161 (describing the blurred distinction
between the public and private spheres as a product of an emerging transnational
world order).
60
BEVIR, supra note 10, at 3.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 67.
63 Id. at 5.
64 Id. at 7.
65 Id. at 5.
66 See Wettstein, supra note 6, at 173 (describing the role of corporate
responsibility as political responsibility).
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corporations are among those institutions with the most profound
potential to impact today’s global structures. Thus, they should
naturally also be among those institutions that bear a responsibility
to contribute toward positive improvement of our global
problems.67 This recognition, combined with the weakening power
of national governments, has resulted in a call for a shift from
external regulatory oversight of corporate entities toward increased
self-monitoring behaviors.
2.2. The Regulatory Transition: From External Supervision to
Voluntary Self-Monitoring
The existing international governance system was built on a
state-centric model characterized by hard national borders and
mutually exclusive territorial jurisdiction. In such a system,
economic activity and international relations were linear, organized,
and conducted via a defined process.68 Under this Westphalian
world order, each state possessed its own independent and
sovereign regulatory powers.69 Power was abrogated from the state
to the international level through state consent. Without such
consent, international mechanisms lacked legitimacy. While some
element of shared interests and institutions existed at the
international level, such a state-centric structure impinged the
development of international norms, and implies – arguably even
requires – that norms at the international level are weaker than
national or subnational norms.70
Under this framework, international law presupposes that
nations will exercise regulatory oversight over transnational
corporations operating within their territory to ensure that the
activities of such entities do not violate the rights – whether social,
civil, or contractual – of individuals and communities under
national jurisdiction.
However, as demonstrated, due to
globalization’s impact on the nature of harm and corporate entities
67 See id. at 170 (arguing for proactive company engagement in addressing
global injustices).
68 See Kobrin, supra note 22, at 359 (explaining the scope of private obligations
in a Westphalian context).
69 See id. at 365 (examining the relationship between transnational corporation
responsibility vis a vis the state).
70 See id. at 359 (describing the limited power of international norms under a
Westphalian order).
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role in contributing to that harm, this type of national oversight is
proving ineffective. Continued operation under a territorial
oversight model will only further entrench the accountability gap
leaving many transnational companies under-regulated and the
structural harm caused unaddressed. As such, it has become
increasingly argued that collective governance mechanisms, rather
than the independent and isolated hierarchical legal regimes
characterized by the Westphalian world order, might prove more
effective at simultaneously strengthening national and subnational
regulatory quality and corporate accountability.71
This is the case for several reasons. At a minimum, it would
prove difficult to extend the hierarchical “hard law” regime beyond
national borders given the lack of an overarching authority within
the international governance system.72 Further, assuming the
existence of such an authority, it is unlikely that the international
community could agree on a meaningful set of standards regarding
the responsibilities of private actors, and the extent to which such
actors should be held accountable.73 Supposing the international
community performed this arduous task of agreeing on a set of
standards, enforcement is likely to remain implausible.74 While the
international system is becoming increasingly less state centered,
states continue to remain the most prominent and powerful actors
and are not likely to cede sovereignty to an international institution
to impose obligations on transnational corporations.75 Therefore,
the most likely outcome would be to establish indirect obligations
on companies by holding nations responsible for corporate
behavior.76 That would be problematic as nations are already
reluctant to intervene across borders to protect human rights
directly and may be even less likely to do so through the convoluted
network of transnational firms.77 Additionally, “[t]here are marked
differences across states—even among the industrialized
countries—in terms of beliefs about the market versus regulation,

BEVIR, supra note 10, at 5.
See Kobrin, supra note 22, at 364 (detailing the challenges associated with
imposing international authority over transnational corporations).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 361.
76 See id. at 364 (arguing for the need for a transnational solution akin to ISO
standards).
77 Id. at 364–65.
71
72
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the relationship between corporations and government, and the
power of the corporate community.”78
Beyond these difficulties lies the more philosophical and
nuanced point that imposing human rights obligations on
transnational firms “through ‘hard’ international law is
anachronistic.”79 Reinforcing this system today is an attempt to
impose a solution derived from the Westphalian international
system on a post-Westphalian collective world. It is becoming
increasingly clear that the realities of today’s globalized society are
in direct opposition to this principle of territoriality that has
characterized the modern approach to global governance.80 While
the recognition that private actors such as transnational firms could
be subjects of international law, and therefore liable under that
system, may be heralded as a significant legal development of the
early twenty-first century, it is nonetheless “an attempt to force a
square peg into a round hole, an attempt to adapt state-centric
international law to a multi-actor environment.”81 In order to properly
address structural harm, collective governance will have to continue
to evolve past this notion of direct and linear accountability
enshrined in the existing hierarchical frameworks.82 It follows then
that more contemporary globalization has been marked by a
transition away from a state-centric world order toward a multiactor collective governance system.83 A fundamental purpose of the
Westphalian world order was to set norms and rules surrounding
the decision-making process around which various actors could
rely.84 To some extent the emerging collective regimes reflect an
absence of public governance in the global arena.85 “[W]hen
78 See id. at 365 (speaking to the difficulty of coalescing around common
interests in a post-Westphalian world).
79 Id. (citing Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Shifting the Point of Regulation: The
International Organization for Standardization and Global Lawmaking on Trade and the
Environment, 22 Ecology L. Q. 479 (1995)).
80 See Wettstein, supra note 6, at 156–57 (arguing that the biggest challenge to
the “territorial principle” is the growing number of global issues that various
countries face).
81
Kobrin, supra note 22, at 365 (emphasis added).
82 See id. at 361 (arguing that a non-hierarchical human rights compliance
mechanism is more feasible in light of states’ reluctance to cede sovereignty to a
transnational human rights authority).
83
Wettstein, supra note 6, at 161.
84 See Kobrin, supra note 22, at 352–53 (describing the historical context of
notions of sovereignty under the Westphalian order).
85 Id. at 365.
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governments are unwilling or unable to govern effectively, political
leaders may see private governance as a valuable tool to achieve
public ends.”86
In a related trend, ideas surrounding the promotion of corporate
accountability have shifted away from the promotion of external
oversight that is characteristic of hierarchical regimes. This shift has
been one toward self-monitoring. This is consistent with the
increasingly recognized and accepted notion that companies have a
responsibility to the societies in which they operate beyond those
enshrined in the law,87 and that managing solely on behalf of
shareholders at the expense of other external stakeholders cannot
sustain performance.88 Globalized communication networks have
further strengthened the ability of these external stakeholders to
detect and publicize wrongdoing. Pressure from such stakeholders
has forced companies to recognize that industry does not exist in a
vacuum.89 This pressure, combined with frequent weak legal
standards, corrupt governments, and non-peaceful means of
resolving social conflict characteristic of developing countries,90 has
forced many companies seeking to minimize risk to self-regulate in
the form of formal, but almost entirely, internal CSR models.91
There currently exists a widespread acceptance of CSR among
corporate actors rising out of the notion that reputational harm can
be as detrimental as legal liability. However, there exists a wide
variation between CSR models across business enterprises.92
86
VIRGINIA HAUFLER, A PUBLIC ROLE FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR: INDUSTRY SELFREGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 29 (2001).
87 See David Spence, Corporate Social Responsibility in the Oil and Gas Industry:
The Importance of Reputational Risk, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 61–62 (2011) (defining
“corporate social responsibility” as an idea that there is an affirmative duty of
corporations beyond those enshrined in law).
88 Id. at 67–68 (quoting R. EDWARD FREEMAN, JEFFRY S. HARRISON, & ANDREW C.
WICKS, MANAGING FOR STAKEHOLDERS: SURVIVAL, REPUTATION, AND SUCCESS 3–4
(2007)).
89 See id. at 61 (noting that increasingly “business is done out in the open” in
the new age of instant communication).
90 See id. at 71 (noting that legal standards may be weak or non-existent in
developing countries).
91 See Matthew Genasci & Sarah Pray, Extracting Accountability: The
Implications of the Resource Curse for CSR Theory and Practice, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. &
DEV. J. 37, 40 (2008) (arguing that a corporate social responsibility policy may offer
companies a better alternative to government regulation); Spence, supra note 87, at
59.
92 See Spence, supra note 87, at 76 (noting that international oil companies
increasingly embrace CSRs because reputational harm, like legal liability, may
diminish positive financial returns in the long run).
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Therefore a definition, let alone a set of norms, for CSR is almost
entirely lacking.93 Despite this, many corporations continue to
engage in CSR efforts in an attempt to balance their best interests
against the desires of the communities in which they do business.94
While CSR has laudable sustainability goals, it has been heavily
criticized. At a minimum, it is often seen as ineffective and
uneconomic: as mere window dressing that is nothing more than
unfairly spending shareholders’ money in ways from which they do
not profit.95 This criticism has not fallen on deaf ears. Rather, a
number of corporate entities are furthering their means of selfmonitoring through voluntary participation in sector-specific
public-private partnerships. These collaborative attempts96 take the
CSR model one step further and promote systemic community
development by assisting governments in developing “both the will
and the capacity to protect human rights, provide security and
public services, and be accountable to their people.”97
These non-hierarchical collective governance mechanisms take
the concept of corporate regulation a step further beyond selfmonitoring. These mechanisms promote the concept of coregulation, which is quite a conceptual shift from the regulation
method of external oversight that is characteristic of hierarchical
regimes. Many of these non-hierarchical collective governance
mechanisms are commonly taking the form of PPPs. PPPs consist of
one or more public sector actors combining with one or more private
or voluntary sector actors to form a collective governance
mechanism. PPPs bring public sector and other actors together to
coproduce policies and services. This emphasis on coproduction
explains some of the other characteristics of PPPs. Here, actors have
an enduring relationship. They actively collaborate with one
another rather than merely entering into a contract.98 Each actor
brings one or more key resources to the partnership in the form of

93 See Genasci & Pray, supra note 91, at 40 (contending that NGOs and
corporations have different meanings for CSRs).
94 See Spence, supra note 87, at 84 (arguing that oil company CSRs are designed
to fill the regulatory void in countries that lack good governance).
95 See id. at 66–67 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 419–
20 (Little, Brown & Co. Law Book Div., 4th ed. 1992)).
96 See id. at 80–81 (using the World Bank’s Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative (“EITI”) as an example of a type of public partnership approach to CSRs)).
97 Id. at 80–82.
98
BEVIR, supra note 10, at 68.
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finance, property, authority, or legitimacy,99 joining the corporate
sector, governments and civil society together in a common cause.100
Non-hierarchical collective governance mechanisms such as the EITI
are consistent with the evolving transnational order; it is within such
frameworks that one has to sketch the outlines of the next iteration
of collective global governance. “That is a difficult task given that
the process of systemic change has just begun to unfold and that
only dim outlines of its eventual endpoint are visible.”101
2.3. Elements of Collective Governance
In political science and legal scholarship, the term “new
governance” describes a broad range of governance forms and
modalities that depart from the above described hierarchical
command-and-control regulation. The term law is sometimes
equated with and confined to such command-and-control
regulation, whereas “new governance is envisaged as existing
largely apart from and beyond law, as an amorphous cluster of new
processes, instruments and values.”102 The parameters of new
governance have not been definitively resolved, but there exists
agreement as to certain constitutive elements: collaboration,
transparency, stakeholder participation, and adaptability. 103
First, new governance envisages an approach to regulation that
is more collaborative than traditional forms of regulation in terms of
the relationship between the regulator and the regulated. Second,
new governance regulatory initiatives give more freedom to the
regulated to determine their internal means of compliance, while at
the same time requiring transparency. Third, new governance
approaches tend to include broad stakeholder participation and
voice.104 This collective governance approach seeks to involve a
broad array of stakeholders from non-governmental organizations,
citizens’ movements, multinational corporations, and the global
Id.
See Wettstein, supra note 6, at 162 (noting the increase in partnerships
between businesses and public institutions to tackle some of the world’s most
pressing problems).
101
Kobrin, supra note 22, at 361.
102
SIMONS & MACKLIN, supra note 21, at 13.
103 Id.
104 Id.
99

100
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capital market. Under this model, the existing institutional system
would remain central with a focus on improving the means of
collaboration across the various institutions at the international level
and between these institutions: the individual communities;
national, regional, and local governments; private entities; and
The purpose of transparency and stakeholder
NGOs.105
participation within collective governance mechanisms is in an
attempt to foster accountability. Finally, new governance is
adaptable in that it emphasizes problem-solving and experimentation
in the ongoing design of regulatory strategies. The remainder of this
chapter will elaborate upon those more clearly defined concepts—
transparency and stakeholder engagement—which relate directly to
accountability. This framework will be used as a basis for the
analysis of the EITI. The more nuanced elements of collaboration
and adaptability will be developed more throughout Chapter 4.
2.3.1. Transparency
Collective governance is characterized by what is referred to as
governance by disclosure, or in other words, a push for transparency.
Governance by disclosure has become a defining feature of
collective global governance models. “To an increasing extent,
private actors such as firms and non-governmental organizations
are becoming involved in the design and operation of transnational
rules that aim to increase transparency.”106 Examples of these
schemes can be found across diverse sectors, including labor rights,
environmental protection, accounting, and telecommunications.107
Transparency as a regulatory strategy is based on the assumption
that reporting will generate information, which can be used to hold
companies accountable. Access to information allows various
stakeholders, including members of the wider public, to pressure
corporations to modify their conduct.108 Regulation of corporate
activity through disclosure is an approach that presents a midway

105
106
107
108

BEVIR, supra note 10, at 107.
Sovacool, supra note 13, at 179.
Id.
BEVIR, supra note 10, at 109–11; SIMONS & MACKLIN, supra note 21, at 150.
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solution between strict external oversight mechanisms and the
purely voluntary self-monitoring found within CSR models.109
Political scientists, legal analysts, governance scholars, and
ethicists have argued that transparency—defined as “timely and
reliable economic, social, and political information accessible to all
relevant stakeholders”—can partially counteract some aspects of
structural harm, as well as, improve social welfare and regulatory
quality.110 A host of progress objectives—anti-corruption, poverty
reduction, sustainable development, economic growth, and better
governance—may be attributed to and catalyzed by the simple act
of transparent accounting alone.111 However, critics respond that
this claim is too good to be true and that these researchers are merely
presuming that such a link between transparency and better
governance exists.112 To ensure better governance, it is imperative
to recognize the distinction as well as the interplay between
transparency and accountability. “The right to information is not
accountability in itself, but is instrumental to it, and transparency
does not automatically produce accountability but is a necessary but
insufficient condition for it.”113 The benefits of transparency are
contextual, and dependent on aspects like the capacity of the
population to understand and use the information and the
accountability mechanisms that can sanction nontransparent
behavior.114 This translation and dissemination of information does
not tend to happen where institutions are weak.115 Therefore,
although accountability requires transparency, transparency does not
necessarily beget accountability.

109 Cf. Andrews, supra note 7, at 60 (arguing that the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative does not “absolutely eradicate” the accountability and
ethical issues that corporations face).
110
Sovacool, supra note 13, at 181.
111
Sara Bracking, Hiding Conflicts over Industry Returns: A Stakeholder Analysis
of The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 4 (Brooks World Poverty Inst.,
Working Paper 91, 2009).
112 See Sovacool, supra note 13, at 180 (citing metrics to argue that countries did
not perform better once subject to EITI compliance standards).
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 See Hans Pitlik, Björn Frank & Mathias Firchow, The Demand for
Transparency: An Emperical Note, 5 REV. INT’L ORG. 177, 178 (2010) (using empirical
evidence to show that most resource-rich countries suffer from poor institutions
and a lack of transparency).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss4/3

2019]

ETI as a Model for Collaborative Accountability

861

2.3.2. Stakeholder Engagement
Another method utilized by collective governance mechanisms
in attempts to foster accountability is the creation of a multistakeholder group. These groups comprise representatives from
various disciplines and functions across government, industry, and
civil society. The goal behind such a diverse group is two-fold. First,
this mechanism seeks to ensure cross-sector representation in the
decision-making process. Each group is representative of a diverse
set of ideas. This representation promotes democratic processes
through public participation. Secondly, such a group functions as a
checks-and-balances system where the primary role of civil society
is to hold government and industry accountable. Their paramount
Within sector specific
purpose is consciousness-raising.116
governance mechanisms these organizations typically operate by
distilling and disseminating report finding to communities. The
goal of this communication is to raise awareness in order to promote
reform.117
Like transparency, the multi-stakeholder nature of this
framework does not necessarily beget accountability. This is
especially the case in developing nations. Often the general public
is not aware of the existence of the governance mechanism nor is it
able to comprehend the content of such reports.118 Without basic
levels of awareness and comprehension, it is not possible for such
efforts to achieve accountability.
Additionally, research
demonstrates that the partnership between civil society and
government is a limited one where governments have not allowed
full civil society participation in the process.119 Naturally, such a
partnership raises questions about civil society’s independence and
whether this relationship inhibits its role as a critical watchdog.120
Such relationships between industry and government call to mind
similar questions regarding corporate motivations in that these
116 See GLOBAL URBAN JUSTICE: THE RISE OF HUMAN RIGHTS CITIES 61 (Barbara
Oomen, Martha Davis & Michele Grigolo eds., 2016) (arguing that civic groups
improve human rights consciousness by raising awareness of human rights issues).
117 Id. at 56.
118 See Andrews, supra note 7, at 71 (arguing that a limitation of the
transparency goals of Ghana’s compliance with the Extractive Industry
Transparency Initiative was a lack of awareness of the initiative by the local
population).
119 Id.
120
GLOBAL URBAN JUSTICE, supra note 116, at 58.
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relationships fail to recognize the perils of influence.121 Critics argue
that the public is better served when struggle between the public
and private sector exists. The danger of collaboration in this way
with industry presents an opportunity to “conflate the common
good with common ground.”122 It allows industry to frame public
concerns in a way that is most beneficial, in other words, least
threatening to their commercial interests.123
3. AN EXAMPLE OF COLLECTIVE GOVERNANCE: THE EXTRACTIVE
INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE
To add context and a level of specificity, the next two chapters will
utilize the EITI as a focal point to illustrate how the aforementioned
general concepts of collective governance mechanisms operate within
one, notably opaque, industry sector—the extractive industry. The first
section will expand specifically on the type of structural harm caused
by the presence of extractive industries in the developing country
context. It will be followed by a discussion of how the industry seeks
to self-regulate through the EITI and finish with an analysis of the
EITI’s effectiveness as a global governance mechanism. The EITI
initiative is fueled by the growing intersection between civil society
led social movements on the one hand and the corporate sector on
the other.124 “Governments play an important role by leading the
initiative, making the multi-stakeholder arrangement an example of
what has become known as ‘collective governance.’”125
3.1. The Reason Behind the EITI – The Resource Curse
It is not only well documented that weak governance resulting
in poor regulatory quality is compounded in the context of
developing nations;126 but additionally—by their very nature—
121
Jonathan Marks, Associate Professor of Bioethics, Human. and L.,
TEDxPSU at University Park: In Praise of Conflict (Feb. 12, 2017).
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 See Andrews, supra note 7, at 60–61 (describing the underlying motivation
for the establishment of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative).
125 Id. at 60.
126
SIMONS & MACKLIN, supra note 21, at 16.
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extractive operations are rife with inherently dangerous activities
due to the simultaneously technical and mechanical nature of such
operations.127 Due to the hazardous nature of mineral extraction, the
magnitude of risk assumed by those engaged in resource
development spans a broad spectrum including environmental,
health and safety, liability, as well as, reputational.128 “The business
of exploring for and producing [resources] will always entail
environmental costs and social challenges.”129 In developed
countries, mitigation and regulation of these risks is done through
the rule of law in the form of regulation.130 While regulatory failure
or human error cannot be entirely prevented, it is expected in
industrialized democracies that the legal system will structure
relationships between corporations and external stakeholders in a
manner that provides redress for harm and fairly apportions
liability.131 The risks assumed are further compounded by the social
and political contexts in which extraction companies often operate,
as this relationship is often non-existent in the context of developing
nations either due to a dearth of regulation or inadequate
enforcement thereof. “Therefore, societies look to [extractive]
companies to self-regulate: to do more to guard against risks to
society than merely comply with the law.”132 Corporate entities
within the extractive industry may not be able to void finding
themselves in such a position. These corporations are constrained
by the location of resources. Companies must operate where
minerals are found. Companies within the extractive industries are
therefore more likely than other industries to find themselves in
areas of weak governance due to this lack of mobility.133
Such direct corporate self-regulation proves difficult for several
reasons.134 Extractive industries are often under political control,
meaning that there exists rampant blurring of the lines between
public, shareholder, and personal interests. This is especially true in
the case of state owned companies.135 Additionally, there exists
127 See Spence, supra note 87, at 59 (citing the Deep-Water Horizon oil spill as
an example of the dangers involved in extractive industries).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 84.
130 Id. at 60.
131 Id. at 70.
132 Id. at 60.
133
SIMONS & MACKLIN, supra note 21, at 16.
134 Id.
135
Sovacool, supra note 13, at 187.
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limited competition in the extractive sector,136 which results in fewer
transnational checks and balances compared to more competitive
sectors.137 Further, the channels of integration for resource rich
countries into the global economy are often limited, opening
avenues for illicit financial flows.138 Finally, the complex processes
of extractive sectors require technical and financial expertise. This
leads to companies, rather than countries, doing much of the
accounting for tax payments, especially in developing countries,
which leaves room for misappropriation in cases where reliable
auditing is limited.139
In the late 1990s and early 2000s—paralleling the academic
discussions surrounding globalization—there was growing
international recognition of, and attention paid to, the phenomenon
of the resource curse. The term “resource curse” has been coined to
describe the phenomena that occur when countries continue to
exhibit comparatively high levels of poverty and inequality,
deteriorating environmental quality, institutionalized corruption,
and an increased frequency of conflict despite decades of natural
resource development.140 According to resource curse scholars,
while revenue from oil, gas, and mining companies in the form of
taxes, royalties, signature bonuses, and other payments is expected
to be an important engine for economic growth and social
development in resource-rich countries, the lack of accountability
and transparency in these revenues “often aggravates poor
governance and leads to corruption, conflict, and poverty.”141 For
example, in the Niger Delta, after years of oil exploration and
production, the lives of average citizens have remained relatively
stagnant even though oil companies have a number of CSR
initiatives targeted at bettering the lives of people.142
136
Jon Yeomans, Revealed: The Biggest Companies in the World in 2016, THE
TELEGRAPH
(June
20,
2016),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/07/20/revealed-the-biggestcompanies-in-the-world-in-2016/ [https://perma.cc/S4XR-2BJ7] (stating five of
the top ten Fortune 500 companies were oil and gas companies suggesting that the
technological resources are concentrated within a few large transnational players
rather than a multiplicity of smaller players. The remaining five companies were
from retail, energy, automotive and tech).
137
Sovacool, supra note 13, at 187.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 180.
141
Andrews, supra note 7, at 61.
142 Id. at 64.
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This is just one example of where the potential benefits of natural
resource wealth are not being realized.143 Paradoxically, such
wealth is routinely associated with a litany of problems, including:
currency appreciation; the decline of non-resource sectors –
commonly referred to as the Dutch Disease; tax system failures, such
as revenue capture by elites due to a break down in the
accountability that results from tax collection; as well as the
exacerbation of regional and community tensions.144 Corruption
and opacity plague those countries and companies involved in
resources extraction.145 Additionally, it has been established that the
collusion between corporations and government officials further
compounds the adverse consequences of resource wealth.146
However, the extent of the resource curse is contingent on multiple
factors including political incentives, the types of resources the
country in question has, and the nature of rent seeking.147
These structural obstacles seem to be best counteracted (or
otherwise avoided altogether) by particular structural advantages.
More specifically, counter-weights to this resource curse appear to
be political stability, economic diversification, and active civil
society engagement.148 The presence of these problems and the
absence of their counterbalancing structural advantages presents a
wide range of governance challenges that quickly outstretches
developing nations capacity, including: the need to develop fair,
efficient, and inclusive systems for licensing; bidding; contracting;
revenue collection; auditing; and public spending.149 Increasingly,
environmental and social impacts of these industries became causes
of complaint. Even though it was widely recognized that there was
no single reform that on its own could effectively address all of these
problems, a common conclusion was that greater transparency and
dialogue between stakeholders must be part of the solution.150 The
EITI was developed in response to the resource curse and in an
attempt to fill this governance void.

143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150

Short, supra note 46, at 8.
Id.
SIMONS & MACKLIN, supra note 21, at 16.
Andrews, supra note 7, at 63.
Id. at 63–64.
Id. at 64.
Short, supra note 46, at 8.
Id. at 9.
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3.2. An Overview of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative:
What is the EITI and How does it Operate?
The EITI offers a useful template by which to assess the value of
collective governance mechanisms, if any, on the international
stage.151 The EITI is one example of a collective governance
mechanism that seeks to address the above-described structural harm
caused by the presence of extractive industries within developing
nations. It is a trans-national public-private partnership supported
by a coalition of government, companies, and civil society that takes
a sector-specific, multi-stakeholder approach to create an
international governance framework in an attempt to
simultaneously promote regulation by governments and corporate
responsibility within the extractive industry.152
Partnership
initiatives such as the EITI seek to bring industry and government
sectors together in nation-building.153 Generally speaking, nationbuilding efforts seeks to promote governance structures, improve
workforce conditions, build transparent and productive
relationships between business enterprises and the government,
and reduce corruption.154 The EITI defines itself as “a global
standard to promote the open and accountable management of oil,
gas and mineral resources” and address governance issues within
the industry.155 It recognizes that poor natural resource governance
leads to corruption, conflict, and the mismanagement of these
resources and their associated profits. Consequently, stagnating
social development and economic growth rather than utilizing this
wealth for public benefit.156
Put simply, the EITI is about ensuring that citizens have access
to reliable and useful information regarding how much their
governments receive from the exploitation of their nation’s finite oil,
gas, and mineral resources. To achieve this, EITI implementation
has two core components – transparency and stakeholder
Sovacool, supra note 13, at 179.
EITI INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, Who We Are, EITI, https://eiti.org/whowe-are [https://perma.cc/F6LE-A9KT], [hereinafter EITI, Who We Are], (defining
EITI as the global standard to promote the open and accountable management of
oil, gas and mineral resources).
153
Spence, supra note 87, at 83.
154 Id.
155
EITI, Who We Are, supra note 152.
156 Id.
151
152
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engagement.157 The transparency prong requires oil, gas, and
mining companies to disclose their payments to the government;
and the government, its receipts. The figures are reconciled by an
independent administrator and published in annual EITI Reports
alongside contextual information about the extractive sector. The
second prong is the creation of the multi-stakeholder group. The
multi-stakeholder group is comprised of representatives from
government, companies, and civil society. It is established to
oversee the accounting, auditing, and reporting processes and is
charged with disseminating the findings of the EITI Reports. More
broadly, it should promote the integration of the EITI domestically,
as well as extractive industry reform efforts. The overarching goal
of these two prongs is to enhance accountability within the
extractive sector by strengthening both government and corporate
governance systems.158
3.2.1. A Developmental Timeline of The EITI
The EITI was created in 2002 to improve the domestic
governance in resource-rich countries by bringing global
accountability to the collection of revenues.159 The idea came about
as a way to avert the specific type of structural harm caused by the
presence of extractive industries in developing nations.160 In 2003,
the EITI’s Statement of Principles (Principles)161 was agreed to,
centering on the need for the transparent management of natural
resources.162 The EITI Principles recognize the importance of the
“prudent use of natural resource wealth” for sustainable
development, as well as, the sovereign right of states over their
natural resources.163 In accordance with the aforementioned
discussion on collective governance mechanisms, these twelve
Principles enshrined two key prongs: transparency and stakeholder
Short, supra note 46, at 10.
Id.
159
Sovacool, supra note 13, at 179.
160 For a more detailed discussion of the resource curse, see Andrews, supra
note 7, at 63.
161
EITI INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, EITI Principles, EITI, (Feb. 2016),
[hereinafter EITI, EITI Principles] https://eiti.org/document/eiti-principles
[https://perma.cc/EJZ4-XSR8] (last visited June 7, 2017).
162 Id.
163 Id.
157
158
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engagement. An underlying rationale of the EITI is that these
elements will remove the blinds that make the extractive industries
opaque.164 The Principles set forth a workable approach to the
disclosure of payments to governments by corporations within the
extractive industry with the notion that public understanding of
these revenues would assist public debate and inform decisions
surrounding appropriate and realistic options for sustainable
development.165 Over 40 institutional investors signed a statement
of support for the EITI under the assumption that this type of
information disclosure would improve corporate governance and
reduce operational risk.166
The Principles were incorporated into the initial EITI Standard
(Standard) launched in 2011.167 The Standard set out 21 specific
Requirements for EITI implementing countries, including
provisions on sign-up, preparation, disclosure, dissemination,
Only two of these
review, validation, and compliance.168
Requirements are directives to corporations. The remainder almost
exclusively set out guidelines for governments.169 At their inception,
these Requirements were a set of minimum standards. The Standard
was first revised in 2013,170 and again in 2016. Each iteration of
Requirements builds upon the previous set.171 The 2013 changes had
five broad aims: (1) making EITI reports more comprehensible; (2)
increasing the relevance of the EITI through national dialogue; (3)
enhancing disclosure requirements; (4) improving the validation
system in order to recognize countries that exceed the minimum
requirements; and (5) making the Requirements more coherent.172
More specifically, the 2013 Standard enhanced countries’ role in the
implementation of the EITI domestically by introducing new
disclosure requirements, including but not limited to information
Andrews, supra note 7, at 63.
EITI, EITI Principles, supra note 161, at 4.
166
Short, supra note 46, at 10.
167
EITI INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, EITI RULES, 2011 EDITION (Apr. 4, 2011)
https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/documents/EITI_Rules_Validations_April20
11_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/VS98-FVB3] (last visited May 9, 2017).
168 Id.
169 Id.
170
Jonas Moberg, Charting the Next Steps for Transparency in Extractives, EITI
(May 10, 2013), https://eiti.org/blog/charting-next-steps-for-transparency-inextractives [https://perma.cc/PVR8-FTDG].
171
Short, supra note 46, at 10.
172
SIMONS & MACKLIN, supra note 21, at 152.
164
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surrounding the transfer of national funds to subnational entities,
disclosure of corporate social contributions where contractually
required, and reporting of financial transfers between state owned
companies and other government entities.173
Until the adoption of these enhanced Standards, there was a
danger that EITI reporting simply ticked boxes but did not actually
lead to improved transparency. Successful EITI implementation at
the national level hinges on the ability of the process to develop to
meet the diverse on-the-ground challenges present in each country
in order to encourage reform of the underlying systems. For
example, in some countries, corruption is a significant challenge and
EITI reporting assists in that it is the first step in verifying these
funds and assuring their proper accounting.174 Other countries face
other challenges, such as building trust in local communities.175 This
makes extractive sector governance and regulatory quality a priority
warranting a greater focus on sub-national transfers and operations
in local communications.176 In all the countries, data must be
reported to relevant populations in such a way that it leads to
informed debate, which would ideally result in better management
of the extractive sector within that community.177 The adoption of
the 2013 Standard encourages implementing countries to go beyond
the minimum requirements where appropriate.178 Further, it calls
on multi-stakeholder groups to set implementation objectives that
are reflective of national priorities.179 The multi-stakeholder groups
are also encouraged to be innovative in regard to the methods of
public reporting, keeping in mind that the primary goal of reporting
is to increase comprehension in order to foster accountability across
the industry.180 This innovation can take reporting to a higher level
than simple accounting audits. It has led to some countries
requiring disclosure of the nature and content of contracts, and
where not disclosed, an explanation why publishing was not
Short, supra note 46, at 10; Moberg, supra note 170.
Short, supra note 46, at 11.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 See EITI INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, THE EITI STANDARD 2016, at 32
(Rogan Dyveke ed., Feb. 23 2016) [hereinafter EITI STANDARD],
https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/documents/english-eiti-standard_0.pdf28
[https://perma.cc/DLB9-79TR] (referencing Requirement 8.3).
179 See id. at 14–5 (referencing Requirement 1.4).
180 Id.
173
174
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feasible.181 The 2013 Standard requires transparency beyond
revenue payments from companies to governments, including
disclosure of licensing information, sales by state-owned companies,
and significant social payments made by companies. It also requires
that reports provide contextual information on questions such as tax
arrangements, proportion of government revenues from extractives,
quantity of production, and likely exhaustion dates, so that a
member of the wider public reading the report would be better able
to understand the contributions and implications of the presence of
the extractive industry to their economy and society.182
The 2016 changes await their 2020 implementation, but they
make a particularly noteworthy addition to the 2013 Standards.183
“The most groundbreaking aspect of the 2016 EITI Standard is that
the identity of those that own and profit from extractive activities
must now be disclosed. All countries must ensure that the
companies that bid for, operate or invest in extractive projects
declare who their beneficial owners are.”184 Identifying who owns
extractive companies and disseminating this beneficial ownership
information will enhance the public’s ability to expose corruption
and to hold corporations accountable.185
3.2.2. EITI Operations
In order to be recognized as an EITI implementing country, the
government of a nation needs to apply for “EITI Candidature.”186 A
number of sign-up steps is required, including constituting the
multi-stakeholder group. Once the country has been accepted as a
candidate she has 1.5 years to publish an initial EITI Report and 2.5
years to complete the validation process.187 The EITI Board conducts
a validation process to assess a country’s progress in complying
with each of the Requirements outlined in the Standard.188 Detailed
Short, supra note 46, at 11.
Id.
183
EITI INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, 2016 EITI STANDARD: FROM REPORTS TO
RESULTS (Feb. 24, 2016), https://eiti.org/news/2016-eiti-standard-from-reports-toresults [https://perma.cc/WY8C-AFYB].
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187
Short, supra note 46, at 11.
188
EITI STANDARD, supra note 178.
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guidance on the process is set out in the EITI Validation Guide.189
Countries that satisfy the requirements are designated compliant.190
If a country is deemed non-compliant it may either be suspended191
or delisted192 from EITI membership. Suspension is a temporary
mechanism. The suspension may be lifted at any time the board
deems the matter resolved. At that time, a country’s compliant
status would be reinstated.193 The Board also reserves the right to
revoke a country’s status “where it is manifestly clear that a
significant aspect of the EITI Principles and Requirements are not
adhered to.”194 A country has the right to appeal either decision by
the Board.195
To date, there are 52 implementing countries.196 Since its
inception, the EITI has reconciled and disclosed USD $2.3 trillion in
revenues paid by the extractive industries to governments.197 Over
750 people serve on EITI multi-stakeholder groups and 350 people
around the world work full time on the EITI.198 Moreover, the
European Union, African Union, G8 and G20, and the United
Nations have all endorsed the EITI.199 Compliance and candidacy
under the EITI is perceived to carry with it a vast array of benefits
for countries and corporations. Countries use EITI membership to
strengthen the investment climate.200 It is a signal to investors and
financial institutions that there will be increased transparency,
accountability, and governance. For corporations and investors,
doing business in these countries reduces political and reputational
risk.201
With implementing governments from all continents committed
to reforms and openness to varying degrees and with varying levels
189
EITI INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, EITI VALIDATION GUIDE (May 27, 2016),
https://eiti.org/document/eiti-validation-guide [https://perma.cc/D8T7-6ZDV].
190
EITI STANDARD, supra note 178, Requirement 8.3; Short, supra note 46, at 10.
191
EITI STANDARD, supra note 178, Requirement 8.6.
192 Id. Requirement 8.7.
193 Id. Requirement 8.6.
194 Id. Requirement 8.7.
195 Id. Requirement 8.8.
196 See generally EITI INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, EITI COUNTRIES (2017),
https://eiti.org/countries [https://perma.cc/3FTE-QKK5] (describing how
countries are progressing towards meeting the 2016 EITI Standards).
197 Id.
198
Short, supra note 46, at 11.
199
Sovacool, supra note 13, at 179.
200 Id. at 181.
201 Id.
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of economic development, many more specific factors motivate EITI
implementation, all of which are based on the following
assumptions. The primary assumption is that greater transparency
leads to less corruption within political elites, collusion between
governments and companies, and mismanagement of funds.202
Additionally, following an internationally recognized standard
demonstrates a general commitment to openness and reform.203 It
is further assumed that EITI compliance will ensure that both
corporate and governmental accounting and auditing systems are
functioning efficiently and effectively. Lastly, in practice these
accounting
and
auditing
processes—the
transparency
mechanisms—are self-reinforcing, meaning that undertaking these
endeavors will not only identify accounting errors, but also will
highlight opportunities to reform and strengthen these systems.204
“The EITI [therefore] operates on the principle of having free,
full, independent, and active assessments of the ways that various
companies within the extractive industries interact with
government and impact communities and society.”205 Presently, the
EITI targets host state behavior by providing information about
payments to governments by extractive industry companies.206 The
hope is that this information, once in the hands of citizens, will be a
tool for accountability and a catalyst for necessary reform.207 As
such, this financial information plays into the larger agenda of host
state governance and host state regulation of corporate actors, but
for the time being it only indirectly addresses the conduct of
transnational corporations.208
Like other multi-stakeholder initiatives, EITI has evolved from a
set of ideals to a governance “regime” with norms, membership
criteria, compliance processes, and a governance structure. The
underlying intent of the EITI is that through proper financial
disclosure, these corporate and governmental institutions and their
respective actors will become empowered to perform their
development-oriented role.209 Although the EITI’s work appears to
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
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Sovacool, supra note 13, at 179.
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have established transparency as a norm within extractive industry
governance—a feat in its own right—the utility of this norm is still
up for debate. To examine the validity of the critics’ claims, an
analysis of the EITI will be conducted herein. However, the mere
existence of this debate should be sufficient to challenge us to be
modest and to examine critically the practical utility of global norms,
particularly those that are based on voluntary compliance.210
Achieving transparency may not be the cure-all it has been lauded
to be, especially where civil society is not strong enough to convert
the information received into accountability.211
3.3. Effectiveness of the EITI
It was once widely thought that PPPs would be an allencompassing governance solution,212 but despite best efforts, the
effectiveness of the EITI is constrained by many factors including
illiteracy, livelihood demands, lack of interest, as well as cultural
and political factors.213 In many developing countries, particularly
in Africa, public discussion of extractive industry revenues and civil
society activity is discouraged, which inhibits development.214 The
EITI makes the claim that it contributes positively to the
achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.215 But, based
on recent social science research, there is seemingly little marked
evidence that it does.216 It merits noting, however, that it is difficult
to quantify the effects of EITI reporting because intangibles such as
corruption, trust, and capacity do not lend themselves to easily
quantifiable metrics.217
Previous
studies
have
examined
the
emergence,
institutionalization, and accountability mechanisms of transnational
Id. at 62.
Sovacool, supra note 13, at 188.
212
BEVIR, supra note 10, at 68.
213
Sovacool, supra note 13, at 188.
214 Id.
215 See EITI INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, HOW THE EITI CONTRIBUTES TOWARDS
MEETING
THE
SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
GOALS,
(Nov.
2016),
https://eiti.org/document/how-eiti-contributes-towards-meeting-sustainabledevelopment-goals [https://perma.cc/KNR4-FP2Y] (describing the Sustainable
Development Goals and the efforts contributed by EITI to meet these targets).
216
Sovacool, supra note 13.
217
Short, supra note 46, at 13.
210
211
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standards for transparency, but less is known about their
effectiveness.218 The study explored in this section statistically
analyzes the efficacy of transnational disclosure standards of the
EITI.219 For these purposes effectiveness is defined based on
whether the transparency engendered by the EITI actually results in
better governance and development outcomes in EITI compliant
countries by looking at eight distinct metrics: accountability;
political stability; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule
of law, corruption; foreign direct investment; and growth in per
capita GDP.220 Researchers looked at two research categories to
determine EITI effectiveness. The first category was whether there
were significant differences in the developmental metrics between
EITI and non-EITI countries. In the second category researchers
analyzed whether differentiation occurred within the same country
prior to and after EITI implementation.221 The study utilized
comprehensive, peer-reviewed data from the World Bank. This data
was sourced from more than 30 other sources permitting
meaningful comparisons.
This study found no statistically
significant differences across any of the eight developmental metrics
for either research category.222 Despite recognized limitations of the
study,223 the research concluded that the “EITI has an insubstantial
role at affecting key governance indicators.”224 Acting in the absence
of the institutional weight of governmental support, the EITI is
unable to ensure good governance and proper accountability.225
This analysis suggests that the EITI is not as successful as its
advocates want us to perceive it to be. 226 However, despite these
general conclusions and although not statistically significant, the
analysis does indicate possible positive effects of the EITI initiative on
the metric of regulatory quality.227 Regulatory quality during
candidacy was found to be significantly greater than zero and higher

218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
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Sovacool, supra note 13, at 179.
Id.
Id. at 179–80.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 180, 185.
Id. at 188.
Id. at 186.
Andrews, supra note 7, at 72.
Sovacool, supra note 13, at 188.
Id. at 185.
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than the non-EITI country comparison group in the phase directly
prior to EITI implementation.228
While it was expected that the EITI would prove a better
governance tool than CSR measures, it has not seemed to do so.229
In my opinion, however, effectiveness is only one tool by which to
gauge a collective governance mechanism, and while valid, it is
arguably a short-sighted metric. Its use here is equivalent to
announcing a marathon victor after determining who was in the
lead at the first yard. There is simply still too much race left to run.
The development of the EITI is a process. All effective processes
take time and iterations to develop into a working form, and all
global processes take even more time. Further, the EITI demonstrates
that global governance mechanisms are an iterative process, one oftrefined through trial and error. The EITI therefore should neither be
lauded for its effectiveness nor condemned (yet) for its lack thereof.
Rather, it should be recognized that the EITI played an important
role in catalyzing the development of consensus around the need for
transparency norms on payments to governments.230 At this time, it
is immaterial that these transparency norms have not positively
impacted governance. The EITI continues to play a useful role in
clarifying problems within the industry and identifying potential
remedies while building necessary support for reform.231 This is due
to the unique position the EITI has been able to carve for itself within
the global governance arena. It has successfully departed from both
the hierarchical, external oversight mechanisms, as well as the
purely voluntary self-monitoring models encompassed throughout
CSR initiatives. Its success in this departure can be attributed to
insisting upon multi-stakeholder participation. This ensures that
stakeholder voice is heard, heeded, and incorporated throughout
the design and implementation of the EITI.
Bringing the diverse, complex, and often conflicting set of
stakeholders—including multinational and state-owned companies,
host and home governments, industry groups, international
financial institutions, investors, and civil society groups—within the
industry together around the table is an accomplishment in itself.
As a multi-stakeholder initiative, the EITI is able to emphasize its
message—encouraging the prudent use of natural resource wealth
228
229
230
231
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in the interest of national development—across a wide range of
actors. This multi-stakeholder approach is one of the unique
features of the EITI. The expectation is that opening the books
would build trust between different stakeholders of the extractives
sector, and also promote accountability between governments and
corporations on one hand and society on the other, thereby
advancing public interest.232 In the long-run, this collaborative
rather than combative approach will likely make the EITI more
useful as a global governance mechanism than other approaches.233
Since its inception the EITI has demonstrated that such a multistakeholder approach can go beyond the lowest common
denominator standard and create a process of learning that has
gradually raised the bar. This has helped to create an expectation of
transparency in the extractive sector which was previously
notoriously opaque and murky.234 As such, transparency and
stakeholder participation have become mutually reinforcing
mechanisms within the EITI’s governance scheme.
But,
transparency by itself cannot ensure the responsible use of resource
revenues.235 In order to move resource governance toward holistic
and sustainable development there must be a new addition to the
collective governance model—the addition of collaborative
accountability.236
4. INCORPORATING COLLABORATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY INTO THE
COLLECTIVE GOVERNANCE MODEL
Despite the traction that collective governance models like the
EITI have gained in the global governance arena, they have yet to
depart entirely from their Westphalian, command-and-control
counterparts. As such, collective governance models still retain
certain attributes of those regimes. One such attribute is the concept
of linear liability.237 Without a departure from this toward a more
collaborative accountability mechanism, attempts by the EITI to
Andrews, supra note 7, at 63.
Id. at 76.
234
Short, supra note 46, at 14.
235
Sovacool, supra note 13, at 188.
236
Short, supra note 46, at 14; Rockstrom, supra note 5, 19–20; Sovacool, supra
note 13, at 189.
237
Wettstein, supra note 6, at 157.
232
233
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engender sustainable development will likely be in vain. It bears
noting that I do not advocate an unconditional replacement for the
existing accountability model. Where corporations actually cause
direct harm, they should be held to account under the linear liability
model. However, I am advocating the addition of a second prong
to this existing accountability mechanism measured in degrees of
positive change. This means that we should investigate not only
those instances where corporations actually cause harm, but also
where either their failure to act or their actions do not result in
degrees of positive developmental change.238
Collaborative accountability can be defined by several
characteristics, all of which are recognizable within the EITI
initiative even though some still require significant development.
The first characteristic is based on the assumption that most of the
pressing global problems must be solved collectively, requiring
proactive, multi-sector—government, industry, and civil society—
participation. Second, collaborative accountability requires a larger
emphasis on omission from taking positive action rather than the
commission of harmful action as the cornerstone of corporate
responsibility.239 This shifting emphasis on omission implies that
corporate responsibility reaches beyond negative obligations to do
no harm and includes positive obligations.240 Lastly, these positive
obligations must be framed as political responsibility.241 Political
responsibility means actual engagement in and facilitation of the
political process and corresponding discourse.
Political
responsibility may be best understood as a communicative
responsibility.242 Otherwise stated, it is a responsibility to engage in
a public discourse with others for the sake of organizing our
relationships and coordinating action most justly.243
This chapter will explore these concepts further by identifying
how linear liability fails to serve as an effective accountability
mechanism within the context of structural harm. This is followed
by a discourse illuminating why collective governance models must
assign more accountability to corporations in order to support

238
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sustainable development goals. The final section focuses specifically
on how the EITI currently operates to achieve this.
4.1. The Blurred Lines of Liability
As demonstrated, the world is turning toward more
collaborative and participatory forms of governance,244 but within
this system exists fragmented and overlapping authority.245 The
individualism of this model, built upon concepts of linear liability,
counter-intuitively limits, rather than expands, the accountability
for collectively produced harms, allowing institutional actors such
as transnational corporations to both intentionally and
inadvertently avoid responsibility.246 When viewed through the
lens of linear liability, this fragmentation of authority creates an
accountability gap because the nature of structural harm is not
linear.247 The type of structural harm posed by the resource curse is
too nuanced to fit within the current linear conception of liability.
Therefore, collaboration, not only surrounding the decision-making
process—as demonstrated by multi-stakeholder involvement in the
development of EITI’s reporting standards—but also within
accountability mechanisms, will be a necessary condition for
improved regulatory quality in an increasingly interconnected
world.248
There are two aspects to regulatory quality: the decision-making
process surrounding the creation and implementation of regulation,
as well as the accountability mechanism of that regulation. As the
previous chapter demonstrates, much attention has been paid to
building the framework surrounding decision-making within the
EITI; the accountability mechanisms have seen little of this due.
Instead, collective governance mechanisms such as the EITI have
incorporated within their accountability frameworks the existing
accountability model based on the concept of linear liability.249
BEVIR, supra note 10, at 102.
Wettstein, supra note 6, at 161.
246 Id. at 159; see also Michael Green, Institutional Responsibility for Global
Problems 30 PHIL. TOPICS 79 (2002) (maintaining that our understanding of moral
responsibility is inadequate for regulating large scale social and global problems).
247
Wettstein, supra note 6, at 161.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 157.
244
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Linear liability is based on the conception that human relations
consist of small-scale interactions, with clearly demarcated lines of
causation among independent actors.250 Therefore, under a linear
liability model, one would hold those who are causally responsible
for bringing about a problem responsible for rectifying it.251 It is
further assumed in this linear liability model that such responsibility
can be allocated fully between all responsible parties.252 In practice,
however, these precise lines of causation are increasingly obscured
under today’s societal, structural conditions,253 leaving our current
understanding of responsibility inadequate for regulating global
social problems.254
In today’s globalized world, private actors, such as extractive
companies, share enlarged public and political authority, often
operating in roles that were traditionally understood to be those of
the public sphere.255 As such, authority is no longer associated
exclusively with the public sphere, and the line between what is
public and what is private also blurs.256 This line continues to blur
as private enterprises increasingly engage in the decision-making
Despite this increased
processes surrounding regulation.257
authority, increased accountability—the flip side of the coin—has
not followed suit. 258
Linear liability assigns blame in order to compensate for past
wrongdoings. This backward-looking approach is distinct from the
forward-looking nature of collaborative accountability, which
acknowledges the impossibility of tracing individual shares of
responsibility in the case of structural problems. Instead, it is
directed at the transformation of harmful structures by assigning
responsibility for creating positive change to actors even when they
are not to blame for past harm. “The point is not to blame, punish,
or seek redress from those who did it, but rather to enjoin those who
participate by their actions in the process of collective action to
See SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, BOUNDARIES AND ALLEGIANCES: PROBLEMS OF JUSTICE
RESPONSIBILITY IN LIBERAL THOUGHT 39 (2001) (arguing about individual
responsibility in a Global Age); Wettstein, supra note 6, at 157.
251
Wettstein, supra note 6, at 157.
252 Id. at 158.
253 Id. at 162.
254 Id. at 157.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 162.
257 Id.
258 Id. at 161.
250
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change it.”259 This responsibility is a shared responsibility and can
only be discharged through collective action: “[t]he structural
processes can be altered only if many actors in their diverse and
unique social positions work together to intervene in these processes
to produce different outcomes.”260 This requirement and necessity
of collaboration is embedded in the model, which essentially
requires it to be a positive responsibility or, in other words, actual
concrete actions.261
The reality of today’s globalized world presents a mismatch
between the individualism of this linear liability model and the
imperative for collaborative responses to global problems in the
collective age.262 The current conception of accountability as
individual increasingly clashes with the collective nature of
structural harm.263 Moving beyond negative obligations to positive
obligations is not a clear process under the circumstances of largescale structural problems for two reasons. First, under such
circumstances, the full extent of actions is rarely fully
comprehended. Often it is unforeseeable in the sense that a person
or organization could contribute to harm without even engaging in
any overtly harmful action.264 Under such circumstances, the no
harm principle loses normative strength and thus the potential to
Second, if it is
provide guidance for how to behave. 265
indeterminable to what extent and in what manner actors contribute
to a persisting large-scale problem, both blame and its remedial
responsibility cannot be proportionately allocated. As a result, the
structural problem remains systematically unaddressed, or at least
under-addressed. Structural harm is notoriously ambiguous.
Understanding what actions by what actors contributed to the harm
lacks clarity. This complexity combined with the sheer number of
actors breaks the chain of causation. Therefore, in situations of
structural harm, there is a breakdown in the logic of the linear
liability model. It is virtually impossible to pinpoint the exact source
of the harm, and therefore impossible to mitigate it. In actuality, the
linear system may prevent, rather than facilitate, viable solutions for
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
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Id. at 123.
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the most pressing of today’s prevailing global problems.266
Corporate responsibility needs to be reframed to take this into
account. It should be a conception of collaborative accountability
taking into account the multiplicity of today’s actors and the various
interdependencies between them.267
This restrictive nature of the existing liability model in practice
leaves the most pressing and challenging problems we face as a
global society in the domain of supererogatory action.268 This is an
inadequate ethic for the collective age.269 An adequate ethic “must
be able to provide guidance for ascribing responsibility beyond the
principle to do no harm.”270 It calls for a fundamental change in how
we conceptualize what is and is not appropriate corporate conduct
and how we allocate responsibility for misconduct.271 Such an
allocation of responsibility would suggest that while we all have a
responsibility to make a difference, it is those with the greatest
power to have a potential positive impact on the situation who bear
the largest share of accountability. “While everyone in the system
of structural and institutional relations stands in circumstances of
justice that give obligations with respect to all the others, those
institutionally and materially situated to be able to do more to affect
conditions of vulnerability have greater obligations.”272
4.2. The Responsibility of Corporations through the Lens of
Collaborative Accountability
One way of enhancing collaborative accountability mechanisms
is by assigning greater responsibility to institutional agents, such as
corporations. Corporations are better equipped to deal with the
structural conditions of today’s large-scale global problems.
Institutions are better at collecting and processing information than
individuals and more able to bear the costs of regulating large
problems.273 These attributes makes them better able to assess and
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273

Id.
Id. at 158.
Id. at 168.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 169.
Id. at 170.
Green, supra note 246.
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understand indirect effects of their decisions, which place them in
the best position to avoid harmful outcomes linked to their conduct.
Thus, corporate actors have greater leverage and impact in terms of
producing harm, as well as, preventing and remedying it.274 This
shift to collaborative accountability is of large relevance to
corporations not only because they are institutional agents, but also
because they most certainly are among those institutions which have
dramatically increased their authority at the global level. Thus,
corporate responsibility in the collective age must increasingly be
interpreted within this larger conception of collaborative
accountability. This means that corporations must increasingly
collaborate with other private and public institutions in order to
promote positive change in regard to the pressing global problems
we currently face. This claim is not merely ethical, but also
political.275
Corporations should engage in this process and greater
responsibility should be placed with these institutional agents for
several reasons.276 Further, companies have powerful built-in
platforms to advocate for action. When they join together their
voices are much more effective at creating real change.277
Companies possess access and influence that are central to
sustainable development. They play an active role in translating
political programs into action. As such, industry should be at the
forefront of fostering development.278 Additionally, the reputation
of a corporation is one of its most important financial assets.279 Since
corporations exist in the broader social world, they depend on forms
of public governance to sustain them and the conditions under
The perception of corporations as
which they operate.280
instruments for the maximization of private interests is a relatively
young one, and it denotes a distortion of what these institutions
were originally designed to be. Corporations were historically
created as public institutions to address public needs. Profits are an

274
275
276
277
278
279
280

Wettstein, supra note 6, at 160.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 174.
World Comm’n on Env’t & Dev., supra note 1, at 31.
BEVIR, supra note 10, at 49.
Id. at 57.
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instrument to fulfill the corporate purpose, rather than the actual
purpose itself.281
Despite this, corporate actors cannot solve pressing global
problems acting alone. Collaborative accountability is required.282
Collaborative accountability shifts the primary responsibility for
structural problems from individuals to institutions.283 Further, it
detaches the responsibility to contribute to solutions from an actor’s
prior involvement in causing the problem.284 In contrast to the
liability model, a conception of collaborative accountability assigns
responsibility to all actors, whether individual or institutional,
whose contribution is deemed essential for a viable solution to
prevailing global problems regardless of whether they were
involved in causing the problem initially.285 Thus, in order to assign
institutional responsibility for regulating global injustice, it is less
important to show that an institution has actually caused poverty or
a human rights abuse than it is to show how it is capable of taking
remedial steps against them.286 This model places a larger emphasis
on positive obligations. A positive obligation is an obligation to
change the status quo for the better, that is, to improve an
unsatisfactory state of affairs or to assist others in doing so.287 Such
a model is more suitable for the collective age in that it focuses on a
corporation’s contribution to collective efforts aimed at global
problem-solving.288 Therefore, corporate responsibility in the
collective age entails positive obligations. The present view is that
such participation is beyond the call of duty.289
According to the current conception of responsibility,
corporations would not have an obligation to participate in such
discourse unless they were instrumental in causing the relevant
harm. Collaborative accountability suggests otherwise.290 Under a
collaborative accountability model, if the urgency of the situation is
clear to a reasonable person and it seems similarly clear what kind
of action is needed to rectify harm then a positive obligation exists
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290

Wettstein, supra note 6, at 171.
Id. at 160.
Id. at 161.
Id.
Id.
Green, supra note 246, at 125.
Wettstein, supra note 6, at 163.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 163.
Id.
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to act to improve the situation. Further, when the action and
expected outcome are so clearly favorable, a random collection of
individuals may be held responsible for failure to take collective
action.291 “This presupposes that we have an idea about what
constitutes an improvement to a given situation and thus about
what it is that we are striving for in a society.”292 This could be
contentious in regard to global responsibilities as it seems difficult
enough to design a common idea of “good” within the boundary of
a particular culture.293 Therefore, determining with precision what
acts by what actors will make a positive impact is always a daunting
task and may even prove impossible.294 However, in regard to
issues such as global poverty, environmental degradation, climate
change, and sustainable development it is obvious to the reasonable
person that action rather than inaction by the collection is called for
even if the specific required action(s) is not self-evident.295 Despite
this lack of clarity, corporations should not escape accountability.
Rather, they should hold a collective responsibility to participate in
the political conversation about how to best rectify harm. Thus,
under a model of collaborative accountability, all those institutions
with essential and unique capabilities to contribute to potential
solutions for the pressing global problems are accountable for
actively engaging in political discourse on the matter.296 The power
to influence these political processes and outcomes is an important
factor in determining an institution’s degree of responsibility under
a collaborative accountability framework.297
This suggests that corporations should be held accountable not
only for causing harm, but also for failing to engender positive
change in the communities in which they operate. At a minimum,
corporations should be charged with participating in those multiactor policy dialogues that are essential for decision-making
surrounding collective courses of action. Such engagement then is
Id. at 164.
Id. at 176.
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 See Virginia Held, Can a Random Collection of Individuals Be Morally
Responsible?, 67 J. PHIL. 471, 479 (1970) (arguing a collective group may be morally
responsible for not constituting itself into a group capable of deciding upon an
action); Wettstein, supra note 6, at 165 (arguing for a moral responsibility to avoid
inaction even when the required action is not apparent).
296
Wettstein, supra note 6, at 165.
297 Id. at 170.
291
292
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no longer a voluntary CSR initiative as it is commonly perceived. It
no longer belongs to the realm of supererogation, but can be
demanded of corporations. The more vital the role of multinational
corporations in solving large-scale global problems, the more their
participation in such collaborative approaches becomes a matter of
obligation.298 “Corporations that point to a lack of appropriate
platforms that would provide an opportunity for them to participate
in such efforts need to rethink their excuses,”299 especially as
organizations like the EITI continue to grow, develop, and garner
international credibility and become increasingly capable at
providing such a platform. Further, we should consider that
corporations ought to be held accountable where they fail to
participate in the already existing collective governance platforms,
and that they should be charged with participating in building these
platforms where they do not yet exist. “In other words, the
responsibility of corporations may well go beyond merely
participating in such collective attempts; in some situations, they
may have a responsibility to step up and take the initiative in
organizing collective efforts to address certain issues.”300
Business can no longer make do with merely not causing harm
in the pursuit of the goals that they freely choose.301 Rather, the very
purpose of businesses and corporations must be informed and
ultimately legitimized by their potential contribution to the solution
of prevailing social problems.302 A growing number of business
ethicists argue for proactive corporate involvement in addressing
global problems, including the promotion of just institutions, rule of
law, and regulatory quality, as well as a duty to assist poor countries
in their development.303
298 See id. at 166 (describing the need for a shift in responsibility from public to
private spheres).
299
Held, supra note 295, at 480.
300 See Wettstein, supra note 6, at 166 (describing the need for a shift in
responsibility from public to private spheres).
301 See Andreas Georg Scherer & Guido Palazzo, Toward a Political Conception
of Corporate Responsibility: Business and Society Seen from a Habermasian Perspective, 32
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 1096, 1110 (2007) (describing the changing conditions of
corporate responsibility and their expanding domains).
302 See Wettstein, supra note 6, at 171 (arguing for proactive company
engagement in addressing global problems).
303
Scherer & Palazzo, supra note 301, at 1110. See also Wettstein, supra note 6,
at 170–71 (explaining that businesses must go beyond not causing harm in their
pursuits, but instead be informed and legitimized by their contribution to social
problems).
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4.3. Characteristics of Collaborative Accountability within the EITI
The
signs
of
collaborative
accountability—collective
mechanisms, positive obligations, and political responsibility—are
already taking shape within the EITI in a number of ways. For
example, the EITI is a fundamentally collective organization. This is
concretely demonstrated by the EITI’s requirement of “effective
multi-stakeholder oversight.”304 This multi-stakeholder group must
collectively agree to a work plan with clear objectives for EITI
The remaining characteristics—positive
implementation.305
obligations which are framed herein as political responsibility 306—and
how these impact corporate responsibility requires a slightly more
nuanced discussion as laid out below.
The EITI sets forth requirements across eight broad categories.
Each category further delineates mores specific clear-cut guidelines
for compliance of these requirements, which arguably represent
positive obligations of its implementing countries and associated
corporate partners.307
These requirement categories are: (1)
oversight by the multi-stakeholder group; (2) legal framework,
including allocation of contracts and licenses; (3) exploration and
production; (4) revenue collection; (5) revenue allocations; (6) social
and economic spending; (7) outcomes and impact; and (8)
compliance.308 While much of the onus is on the obligations of
governments, notions of corporate responsibility are less overtly
strewn throughout.
Corporations are bequeathed positive
obligations throughout the requirements in two ways: directly and
vis-à-vis the multi-stakeholder group.309 Positive obligations within
the EITI are most frequently in the form of disclosure requirements.
The purpose of these disclosure requirements is to enable
understanding and inform public debate about the governance of
the extractive industries and how resource revenues can be used
effectively. The EITI requires disclosure of information related to

EITI STANDARD, supra note 178.
Id.
306 See Wettstein, supra note 6, at 182 (defining positive obligation as an
obligation to change the status quo for the better).
307
EITI STANDARD, supra note 177.
308 Id. at 12–38.
309 See id. at 13–5 (referencing Requirements 1.2 and 1.4).
304
305
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operational licenses and contracts,310 production data,311 taxes,312
revenue allocations,313 social expenditures,314 as well as impact of the
extractive sector on the economy.315 As of 2020, the EITI will also
require disclosure information regarding beneficial ownership.316
This demonstrates that within the EITI there is a clear trend of
continuing to enhance disclosure requirements and that the EITI as
an organization recognizes that addressing structural harm is an
iterative process.
These obligations are political to the extent that they require
discourse and decision-making surrounding definitional concepts.
For example, not all contracts must be disclosed; there is discretion
allowed within the disclosure requirements in that only those
contracts deemed material must be publicly disclosed. This
discretion is afforded to the multi-stakeholder group which is
charged with determining this materiality. In this way, the
companies who are members of the multi-stakeholder group have
positive obligations to contribute to this type of political discourse
on the subject matter. Companies, even those that are not members
of the multi-stakeholder group, are also directly charged with being
“fully, actively, and effectively engaged in the EITI process.”317 The
multi-stakeholder group is required to commit to work with these
companies and should undertake effective outreach activities
communicating their central role in EITI implementation.318
According to Florian Wettstein:
[This] account of political responsibility provides exactly the
conceptual and theoretical frame for the kind of collaborative
corporate accountability outlined earlier, that is, the
responsibility to participate in and in some instances to
actively organize the communicative platforms that allow a
variety of different actors to deliberate and decide on the

310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318

See id. at 17–21(referencing Requirement 2).
See id. at 22 (referencing Requirement 3).
See id. at 22–6 (referencing Requirement 4).
See id. at 26–7 (referencing Requirement 5).
See id. at 28–9 (referencing Requirement 6).
Id.
See id. at 17–21 (referencing Requirement 2).
See id. at 13 (referencing Requirement 1.2).
See id. at 15 (referencing Requirement 1.4).
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collective courses of action needed to respond to specific
problems.319
As demonstrated, the EITI attempts to do precisely this.
The reality on the ground, however, is that some companies are
not cooperating with the EITI’s vision. There is anxiety that as the
EITI becomes more entrenched in reforming the sector’s policies, the
companies that currently contribute to the annual disclosures
process will cease to do so.320 “[O]ur fear now is that as we proceed
deeper and deeper into reforming the sector, there is the likelihood
that some of the companies would bow out of the EITI because some
of the reforms” are no longer in their favor.321 While membership
within the EITI itself is voluntary, countries are able to prevent
companies from shirking those corporate responsibilities
enumerated within the EITI by legislating the EITI framework
making disclosure mandatory.322
Arguably, such national implementation makes the EITI
redundant. But practically speaking that is not the case. Political
tides at the national level can swiftly change, such as when leaders
transition. One example of this is the recent repeal of the domestic
implementing legislation of the EITI in the United States.323
Wettstein, supra note 6, at 173.
See Andrews, supra note 7, at 72 (describing the limited efficacy of EITI in
the Ghanaian extractive sector).
321 Id.
322 Id.
323
Fredrik Reinfeldt, Statement from EITI Chair on Repeal of SEC’s “Resource
Extraction” Rule, EITI (Feb. 14, 2017), https://eiti.org/news/statement-from-eitichair-on-repeal-of-secs-resource-extraction-rule [https://perma.cc/28CE-CLWU].
On Feb. 14, 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump signed into law Congressional
action to disapprove the portion of Dodd-Frank 1504, otherwise known as the
Cardin-Lugar Amendment, requiring extractive companies listed in the United
States to provide details of payments made to the U.S. and foreign governments.
Dodd-Frank 1504 is derived from the Energy Security through Transparency Act
2009 and complements the global EITI framework of resource revenue disclosure.
See also Vanessa Ushie, Dodd-Frank 1504 and Extractive Sector Governance in Africa,
NORTH-SOUTH
INSTITUTE
(2013),
http://www.nsi-ins.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/Dodd-Frank-Policy-Brief-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TF3D-W2Q6] (examining the implications of Dodd-Frank 1504
for the governance of Africa’s extractive sector); see generally Thea Reilkoff,
Legislating Corporate Social Responsibility: Expanding Social Disclosure Through the
Resource Extraction Disclosure Rule, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2435 (2014) (discussing the
importance of Dodd-Frank 1504 in both the national and international context as a
model for future social disclosure rules across diverse industries and as part of the
growing international movement for transparency in the extraction sector
specifically).
319
320
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International institutions such as the EITI help create a type of
immunity against ill changes of the political tide. They serve as
important mechanisms to establish norms and ensure continuity.
But further, the EITI does more than just publish numbers. It
simultaneously involves people in the decision-making processes.
Although the EITI provides an international standard, it is
implemented at the national level. “The role of the international
management is to support and encourage [the EITI’s] meaningful
This dual framework of national
implementation.”324
implementation combined with international validation will be the
linchpin of the EITI’s success as a governance mechanism. When
countries implement the EITI it is the people of those countries—
through their respective democratic processes—who drive the
initiative. The EITI is simply a platform for dialogue about the
management of their country’s natural resources. The goal is to pry
decisions regarding natural resource management and the
associated revenue out of the private hands of corporate interests
and thrust the conversation onto the public stage. This means that
the decisions regarding how to adapt the EITI implementation
process to best reflect local circumstances, needs, and preferences
are removed from the international body and placed squarely with
those better able to contextualize, localize, and facilitate the political
dialogue: those on the ground at the national level.325
5. CONCLUSION
It may be premature to deem the EITI a success story as an
effective collective governance mechanism, but it is not premature
to laud its accomplishments. The EITI has a flexible, open
organizational mindset that recognizes the complexity of the
problems it seeks to address. This adaptability alone puts it on the
path toward success. However, it must be recognized that there is
still significant work to be done in further establishing corporate
324
EITI INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, HOW WE WORK
(2016),
https://eiti.org/about/how-we-work#implementing-the-standard-nationally
[https://perma.cc/4WBD-KUMJ].
325
Short, supra note 46, at 13. Arguably, cities would be better able to localize
this process than when these processes are handled at the national level. Such a
system would require implementation at the city level vis-à-vis mayors, such as
within organizations like the C40. These concepts are not sufficiently explored
herein, but are ripe for further research.
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disclosure requirements. Transparency has not yet become habitual
corporate behavior, and it still lacks a level of conformity across the
extractive industry.326 However, this is often the case with
international norms.327 What can be said is that transparency in the
extractive industries—a traditionally opaque sector—is no longer
exceptional. The EITI has played a leading role in mobilizing
governments, industry, and civil society in advancing transparency
through corporate disclosure.328 In this way, the EITI embeds
corporations within the problem-solving processes of global
governance.329
The linear liability model no longer provides a satisfactory
approach to counteract harm under current globalized conditions
where injustices are often the result of actions from numerous actors
and an array of organizational policies.330 It can be the case that
those with the greatest power in the system are far removed from
any interaction with those who are most harmed by it.331 A move
toward collaborative accountability is critical in order to adequately
address large-scale structural problems because it is not possible to
trace with specificity the actor who caused the harm.332 It can be
unfortunately tempting to insist on strengthening existing
institutional regimes rather undergoing the onerous process of
inventing new frameworks. However, it is worth considering that
while certain models, like linear liability, may have served us well
historically, they cease to do so today.
Instead it may be time to employ more organic alternatives—
ones which problem-solve and promote positive change through
spontaneous evolution by recognizing when there is the capacity
and ability to make changes and iteratively, intentionally, and
repeatedly remove obstacles to progress. Admittedly, these
models—like the EITI—are less definitive, but might prove more
326 See Sovacool, supra note 13, at 187 (noting the difficulties of examining
financial flows between governments and extractive companies).
327 See Andrews, supra note 7, at 74 (describing the limited effectiveness of EITI
in making the extractive sector less opaque).
328
Sovacool, supra note 13, at 181. See also Short, supra note 46, at 8 (describing
the EITI’s leading role in normalizing transparency in the extractive industries).
329 See Scherer & Palazzo, supra note 301, at 1110 (arguing that transnational
corporations have already started to assume responsibilities once regarded as
governmental).
330 See Wettstein, supra note 6, at 171 (describing the insufficiency of standard
models of responsibility).
331 Id. at 172.
332 Id.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss4/3

2019]

ETI as a Model for Collaborative Accountability

891

productive in a globalized world. Ideally, such a model is reflective
of and reflexive to the needs, cultures, and viewpoints of the diverse
set of stakeholders which it represents333 in order to mitigate the
likelihood of ethnocentrism334 and avoid the tendency to give
priority to only those most apparently detrimental consequences of
our actions.335 This is critically important in the global sphere where
normative standards are not yet broadly accepted and governance
mechanisms are weak. As a transnational institution focused on the
obligations of corporations, the EITI provides the opportunity for
learning, persuasion, and deliberation, all of which are critical to
acceptance of the moral legitimacy and authoritativeness of the
evolving norms, standards, and rules it seeks to establish.336
Although I applaud the EITI’s dynamism, I recognize that its
framework is not without limitations.337 The EITI is confronted with
administrative difficulties in data collection,338 challenges to
integrating EITI efforts with other CSR initiatives, conflicting
stakeholder expectations and power relationships, and disinterest in
reforms.339 Further, the EITI’s narrow definition of transparency is
problematic. It focuses on transparency in government revenue—
the financial flows between industry and national treasuries—but
misses where the corruption is often far worse: in government
spending.340 However, the EITI was never intended to be a standalone initiative, but rather an entry point that would begin “a
process of disclosure and accountability in one link of the value
chain—revenue flows from corporations to the governments of
resource-rich countries,” and a process that would encourage
governance reforms in other parts of the extractive value chain.341
Despite this narrow approach, there is evidence that the EITI has
given communities a means to hold governments and industry

333 See id. at 175 (arguing for a conception of collaborative responsibility as
human rights responsibility in order to mitigate suspicions of imperialism).
334 Id. at 176.
335 Id. at 177.
336
Kobrin, supra note 22, at 367.
337 See Andrews, supra note 7, at 60 (assessing the effectiveness of EITI in the
Ghanaian mining sector).
338 Id. at 69.
339 Id. at 68.
340 See Sovacool, supra note 13, at 187 (noting the difficulties of examining
financial flows between governments and extractive companies).
341
SIMONS & MACKLIN, supra note 21, at 157.
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accountable for extractive revenues and to demand reinvestment of
such funds in their communities.342
The voluntary nature of the EITI is also the frequent subject of
criticism. Again, it was recognized from the outset that the EITI is
not be sufficient on its own accord to drive the necessary reform.
The EITI explicitly recognizes its role as complementary to, and not
exclusive of, other standards, laws, and institutions that are
necessary to ensure effective governance of natural resources. The
initiative was designed as a stepping-stone to further domestic
governance reforms to address rent-seeking behavior and will be
most successful where it is part of wider legal reforms.343
Further, the lack of legally binding obligations does not mean
that adherence is entirely voluntary: agreements may be enforced
through a variety of non-hierarchical compliance mechanisms such
as public opinion.344 Additionally, the EITI Requirements may affect
the public regulatory process in a number of ways: global and
regional trade agreements may explicitly recognize them;
government regulations may refer to them for definition of terms;
and government procurement rules may adopt them. Further,
through pressure consumers, financiers, insurers, and competitors
may insist on observing the Standards’ prerequisites for companies
wanting to do business in that market.345 There are numerous
instances of non-binding commitments evolving over time into hard
international law: the soft law of today can become the hard law of
tomorrow.346 The International Organization for Standardization
(ISO) has evolved ahead of the EITI but is one such example of this
phenomenon.
Increasingly, ISO sets industry standards in
conjunction with or in addition to those set by domestic regulators.
As such, the ISO provides one example of a sector-specific, nonhierarchical regime that morphed, in part, into hierarchical
compliance enforced through hard law as standards were
incorporated within country’s regulatory frameworks.347 Similarly,
the EITI could later develop into such an institution engaged in

Id.
Id. at 152.
344 See Kobrin, supra note 22, at 360 (providing an overview of the various
factors that impact transnational corporate compliance outside of binding law).
345 Id. at 366.
346 Id. at 360.
347 Id. at 366.
342
343
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monitoring violations, judging transgressions and enforcing
compliance.348
Institutional flexibility is important, because uncertainty
regarding the future exists. Models such as the EITI are helpful, but
they are not perfect. These frameworks, while not predictive, inform
processes. Processes take time and global processes take even
longer. While the work of the EITI and transparency in general has
been brandished as ineffective, their current effectiveness is
immaterial. Rather, what is pertinent is the institutional flexibility
that the EITI as an organization possesses: namely, its recognition
that systemic problems such as the resource curse are complex and
further compounded by today’s interconnectedness, its ability to
assess, reassess, and evolve to the changing needs, and the
understanding that this is an ongoing, iterative process. When
assessing organizations like the EITI it is imperative not to read too
much into a static assessment of effectiveness, but to look deeper at
the institutional and organizational structure and its methodology,
processes, and problem-solving strategies. Effectiveness in the
empirical sense is largely immaterial. Rather, we should assess the
degrees of positive change that a sector-specific public-private
partnership like the EITI and other global governance mechanisms
have initiated within the realm of corporate governance. In this
instance, the extractive industry has moved out of the opaque and
murky waters of confidentiality into the expectation of transparency
when conducting transnational operations. This is no small step, but
a colossal feat. And based on its track record the EITI has little
intention of stopping there. Due to its institutional flexibility the
long-term potential of the EITI for effectively creating positive
change within the extractive industry is robust.

348

Id.
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